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A crisis of representation has precipitated a surge in support for populist radical right 
(PRR) parties that challenge the existing model of representative democracy. 
Simultaneously, institutional reforms across Western Europe have sought to improve the 
input legitimacy of local democracy with a proliferation of direct and participatory 
democratic methods. This paper investigates the extent to which PRR parties advance a 
populist democratic agenda when in leadership of the executive at the local level of 
government. Previous work on the subject of PRR parties in power has neglected the 
sub-national perspective, despite the increasing congruence between populist demands 
for a more direct linkage of politics to the people and this institutional environment. An 
exploration of three cases of PRR party-led local government in Italy, Austria and 
Switzerland enables a comparison of their governing behaviour, its ideological content 
and democratic consequences, through qualitative content analysis of referendums, 
policies and council resolutions. This paper finds they do little to promote popular 
sovereignty through participatory forms of governance at the expense of representative 
democracy in local government. However, when in local government environments with 
higher executive autonomy, PRR parties emphasise a more direct (plebiscitarian) 








The belief that politics should be an expression of the sovereignty of the people, 
unrestricted and unmediated by elite institutions of representative democracy, is central to 
the now dominant ideological definition of populism (Mudde, 2004, p. 543). As a result, 
populist parties tend to focus upon defining ‘the people’ and advocate for the elevation of 
their authority in relation to elected representatives (Canovan, 1999; Kaltwasser, 2014; 
Meny & Surel, 2002, p. 13; Mudde, 2007, pp. 150–155). The opportunity to actually 
implement this rhetoric has widened at the local level of government in particular. 
Concurrent with the surge of support for PRR parties in Western Europe since the 1980s, 
widespread reforms have expanded direct and participatory democratic methods 
(Caulfield & Larsen, 2002; Kersting & Vetter, 2003; Scarrow, 2003; Schiller, 2017). Sub-
national government not only acts as a ‘laboratory’ for institutional reform, it is also an 
arena in which parties can test policy (Egner, Gendźwiłł, Swianiewicz, & Pleschberger, 
2018, p. 329; Hendriks, Loughlin, & Lidström, 2010).1 The local government perspective 
taken by this article is therefore the arena in which we would most likely witness the 
implementation of this core set of populist demands. Analyses of populist parties in power 
enable an expanded perspective on their ideology. The transition from opposition to 
government necessitates changes in strategy and corresponding discourse, and more 
constrained prioritisation among competing aims (Albertazzi & Mcdonnell, 2005; 
Castanho Silva, 2017; Zaslove, 2012). However, the actions of PRR parties in power at 
the local level of government is an under-explored area, despite there being many more 
cases open to study. This article explores whether and how PRR parties utilise the 
particular opportunities of local government to apply their democratic ideals, and asks the 
following research question: 
To what extent do PRR parties implement a populist democratic agenda when in power at the 
local level of government in different Western European countries? 
The structure of the article is as follows. First I explore the ambiguous theoretical 
relationship between PRR ideology and representative democracy through the contested 
notions of a populist (radical right) democratic agenda. I conceptualise the populist 
democratic agenda to comprise a plebiscitarian, rather than representative, ideal of 
democracy and a nativist, rather than pluralist, definition of ‘the people’. I then outline the 
various patterns of local democracy in Western Europe following significant reforms in 
recent decades. Systems are distinguished according to the autonomy of the local 
executive in two respects: following Lijphart (2012), the extent to which, firstly, they are 
majoritarian rather than consensual forms of democracy, and secondly, the direct 
democracy capability of the local executive. The paper then explores three cases of PRR 
party-led local government in Austria, Italy and Switzerland in the 2010s to make a 
comparison of their governing practice – specifically, their implementation of elements of 
a populist democratic agenda – in different institutional settings. The data analysed are 
local government initiated referendums, policies and interactions with the council. The 
findings demonstrate how the opportunity structures provided by varying cross-national 
patterns of local democracy influence the extent to which a distinctive idea of popular 
 
sovereignty and definition of ‘the people’ are expressed. Firstly, this study finds that PRR 
parties in all three cases do not implement an expansion of participatory governance, 
despite variations in the opportunity to do so. However the cases vary in the extent to 
which, secondly, the linkage between PRR executive actors and local citizens is envisaged 
in more plebiscitarian terms, and thirdly, an emphasis is placed upon an ethnic definition 
of ‘the people’ through nativist policy. These changes are more evident in the Italian case 
than the Austrian and, least of all, Swiss cases due to the varying degree of constraint 
imposed by power sharing with other parties. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of the 
implications for future research into the consequences of populism for representative 
democracy and hypotheses herein generated for future comparative studies of populist 
parties in (local) government. 
The Democratic Agenda of the Populist Radical Right 
In this section, I address the idea of a ‘populist democratic agenda’ and its expected 
programmatic components. The populist surge that has taken place in Western Europe in 
recent decades is rooted in a ‘crisis of representation’ to which they offer a distinctive 
response (Mair, 2002, p. 88). According to the dominant ideological approach, populism 
is a ‘thin’ ideology which is combined with other ‘thicker’ ideological elements to provide 
substantive demands and a coherent political project. In the case of the PRR, the core 
element is nativism. Populists conceive society as split into two internally homogenous 
and antagonistic camps – the virtuous people and the corrupt elite – and argue for the 
sovereignty of the people unmediated and unrestricted by representative institutions 
(Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008, p. 8; Canovan, 1999, p. 3; Laclau, 1977, pp. 172–173; 
Mudde, 2004, p. 543; Stanley, 2008; Urbinati, 2014, pp. 131, 151). This latter element is 
crucial to their promise of a different vision of democracy (Meny & Surel, 2002, p. 11f; 
Mudde, 2004; Urbinati, 2014, p. 150). The relationship between populism and 
representative democracy is one of ambivalence. While populists presents a challenge to 
its functioning, they also use its institutions to champion the virtues of representation, 
albeit in a more direct form (Taggart, 2004, p. 278). 
Prior to the question of whether and how PRR parties promote a distinctively populist 
democratic agenda in government, the very nature of such an agenda is a hotly contested 
topic. There are different ways to conceptualise the populist challenge to representative 
democracy, in terms of the idealised form of interaction, or linkage, between citizens and 
parties in government. One is a participatory linkage. With politics conceived ideally as 
an expression of the ‘general will’, a ‘delegate’ as opposed to ‘trustee’ style of political 
representation is favoured (Pitkin, 1967). Politicians should above all be responsive to, 
and act in congruence with, citizen preferences, rather than act as representatives free to 
interpret them (Caramani, 2017; Shills, 1956, p. 102). The ideal may take a concrete form 
in calls for the expansion of new forms of democracy to transmit the general will more 
directly (Kaltwasser, 2014, p. 479; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 163; 
Pauwels, 2014, p. 159). Participatory and deliberative methods provide opportunities to 
weaken the existing representative linkage through the empowerment of citizens, anda 
more active form of popular involvement than present in representative democracy 
(Bobbio, 2003). If we are to consider unrestricted popular sovereignty a core element of 
 
the ideological definition of populism, we could therefore expect them to attempt to act 
upon these ideals in government: to behave responsively as delegates and utilise new 
forms of governance that challenge the representative status quo. 
However, the populist ideal of unmediated sovereignty of the people does not 
necessarily mean rule by the people. A form of linkage that contrasts with the participatory 
ideal is that of a plebiscitarian character (Barney & Laycock, 1999; Barr, 2009). While 
similar to the participatory linkage in its pursuit of a more direct connection between 
citizens and government, a plebiscitarian linkage differs in its failure to grant citizens 
control over the process. According to this interpretation, populist actors tend to act as the 
embodiment and more efficient executors of the general will, rather than facilitators of 
citizens to truly govern themselves (Canovan, 2002, p. 34). We should therefore not expect 
the expansion of direct and participatory forms of democracy to be so central to populist 
attempts to foster the circumvention of the rule of ‘elite’ representatives and institutions 
by the ‘will of the people’. While they can be a crucial means of influence for populist 
parties in opposition, populists in power have access to other means with which to achieve 
their goals: for instance through personalised politics and plebiscitary means (Canovan, 
1999, p. 6; Mudde, 2007). There is, therefore, said to be an inherent tension between the 
more direct, even personal, populist representative ideal and the democratic aspirations 
therein embodied (Canovan, 1999, p. 14). Yet populist radical right voters in particular 
tend to in fact be more interested in the improved output of representative democracy than 
in the expansion of participatory forms of democratic input (Bowler, Denemark, Donovan, 
& Mcdonnell, 2016; Webb, 2013, p. 771).2 Direct forms of democracy could therefore be 
considered as a tool used strategically by PRR actors to the extent that they facilitate the 
implementation of higher priority ideological concerns, rather than citizen participation 
being an ideological concern in and of itself. 
The notion of popular sovereignty – fundamental to democracy in general and 
emphasised by populists in particular - leaves ‘the people’ undefined (Kaltwasser, 2014; 
Whelan, 1983). Three possible populist conceptions of ‘the people’ have been identified 
by Meny and Surel (2000): a political one (the people as sovereign), a cultural one (the 
people as native) and an economic one (the people as a class). The nativist ideology of the 
PRR leads to its characterisation by them as an ethno-culturally homogenous group.3 Due 
to their re-definition of demos as ethnos, PRR parties in the government threaten a 
transformation from the existing form of liberal democracy towards an ethnocracy with 
resulting harm to minority rights (Minkenberg, 2001). The relatively few existing studies 
of PRR parties in local power have focused upon their exclusionary impact in particular 
areas of policy: notably, immigration and integration (Bolin, Lidén, & Nyhlén, 2014; Van 
Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014), and cultural policy (Almeida, 2017). However insufficient 
attention has been paid to their relative emphasis on cultural-nativist and political-
sovereign definitions of ‘the people’, and the moderating force of structural factors from 
a comparative perspective.4 The influence of party ideology is expected to be greater in 
local government contexts with a stronger culture of partisanship and greater executive 
autonomy (DiGaetano & Strom, 2003; Schmidt, 1996). According to the hierarchy within 
the ideological conception of populism, the host radical right ideology should be more 
clearly evident when facilitated by contexts of greater autonomy, to a greater extent than 
the ‘thin’ populism (Mudde, 2007; Pauwels, 2014, p. 21). 
 
Direct Democratic Reforms and Patterns of Local Democracy 
The legitimacy of local representative democracy has been widely perceived to be in crisis 
in recent decades (Copus, 2003, p. 120; Kersting & Vetter, 2003; Magnier, 2005; 
WilksHeeg, 2010, p. 382).5 All Western European countries have formally agreed to 
strengthen local autonomy and popular participation in response (Council of Europe, 
1985), yet the extent to which this intention has been implemented via institutional 
reforms varies greatly. As a result, a range of institutional settings provide different 
opportunity structures for European PRR actors to advance a new democratic agenda 
while in local government. Local government input-legitimacy has been addressed 
through institutional reforms to widen the inclusiveness of preferences through an 
expansion of direct democratic control.6 The authority of local political leaders has been 
enhanced with the introduction of directly elected mayors in place of collegial forms of 
government (John, 2001, pp. 16–17). In addition, participatory governance techniques, 
including local referendums, have become more readily available (Council of Europe, 
1993; Scarrow, 2001; Schiller, 2011). A summary of the distribution of these instruments 
for direct democratic control across Western European local governments is shown in 
Table 1. The reforms have reshaped the form of local democracy in these countries, in 
terms of the degree to which they can be characterised, following Lijphart (2012), as 
consensual or majoritarian in nature, due to their effect on the autonomy of the executive. 
Reforms that have introduced direct mayoral elections and the expansion of their power – 
for example in Italy and most regions of Austria – have strengthened the relative position 
of the mayor and caused a shift from a ‘committee-leader’ towards a ‘strong-mayor’ form 
of local government (Mouritzen & Svara, 2002). 
 
Table 1. Direct democracy in Western European local government. 
Elected mayors   
Directly elected mayor Council-elected mayor Not council-elected nor 
directly elected mayor 
Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Switzerland 
Local referendums 
Denmark, France, Ireland, Malta, 




Popular initiatives and government 
initiated referendums institutionalised 
and frequently used 
Government initiated referendums 
fairly common 
Referendums recently 
institutionalised / rarely used 
Austria, Germany, Switzerland Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden 
Cyprus, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Malta, Portugal, UK 
Source: Hendriks et al., 2010. 
aDirectly elected mayors have been introduced in a number of single and combined local authority areas of England 
in the 2000s and 2010s. 
This study proposes two hypotheses regarding the implementation of a populist 
democratic agenda in local government, varying by the level of executive autonomy, as 
outlined in Table 2. The autonomy of the local executive is here considered in terms of 
the strength of majoritarian as opposed to consensual democracy, in particular regarding 
the constraints of power sharing with coalition partners, and itscapacity to initiate 
 
participatory and direct democratic measures. Firstly, in contexts that offer a higher level 
of autonomy to PRR parties in local government, they are expected to promote a 
plebiscitarian, rather than indirectly representative, form of democracy. Secondly, in such 
contexts they are expected to promote a nativist, rather than pluralist, definition of ‘the 
people’. 
 
Table 2. Hypothesised relation between local executive autonomy and democratic agenda 
promoted by PRR-led local government. 
Local executive autonomy 
Democratic agenda promoted by PRR-led local 
government 
Majoritarian (rather than consensual) Direct democracy capacity 
of form of democracy local executive 
Democratic form Definition of 
‘the people’ 
+ + Plebiscitarian Nativist ++ 
+ - Representative with 
plebiscitarian elements 
Nativist ++ 
- + Representative with 
plebiscitarian elements 
Nativist + 
- - Representative Pluralist 
 
According to Lijphart (2012, p. 31) ‘direct democracy cannot be regarded as either 
typically majoritarian or typically consensual’. Yet variants of direct democratic 
instruments that concentrate power, like government-initiated referendums, correspond 
more closely to majoritarian forms of democracy, while others like popular initiatives that 
diffuse power are closer to consensus democracy (Vatter, 2009; Vatter & Bernauer, 2009). 
Lijphart’s distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies has been 
expanded upon by Hendriks (2010) to incorporate subnational democracy. In so doing he 
adds a second dimension regarding direct and indirect democracy, as this level presents a 
‘relatively fertile breeding ground for expressions of, and experiments with, direct 
democracy – more so than the national level’ (Loughlin, Hendriks, & Lidström, 2011, p. 
19). 
Existing cross-national comparisons of the use of direct democracy in local government 
have taken different approaches without considering the role of specific governing party 
ideologies. In general, the primary use of referendums comes from opposition and citizens 
rather than from governing parties (Bowler, Donovan, & Karp, 2002). According to an 
institutionalist perspective, there will be more referendums used in local government 
contexts in which there is greater legal capacity for their implementation and a stronger 
communal tradition of their use (Bützer, 2007, p. 217; Hug, 2004). Furthermore, in a 
comparison between Swiss cantons, Vatter (2003) finds the less consensual character of 
the local democracy (i.e., the more majoritarian), the more referendums in general are used 
as a mechanism that compensates for the power of the executive. To instead consider 
government usage of referendums, a political-strategic perspective is helpful. Direct and 
participatory democracy provide tools to gain influence within policy processes, where 
power is otherwise lacking (Hug & Tsebelis, 2002). Government actors may use 
referendums to strengthen their authority from a position of weakness, for example due to 
intraparty or intra-governmental tensions (Luthardt, 1994, p. 140; Smith, 2016). 
 
Political actors may also draw on the rhetoric of popular sovereignty and direct 
democracy as a form of symbolic representation (Pitkin, 1967), even if not necessarily 
executed in practice. Performance and claims-making are particularly important elements 
of political representation for populist actors, therefore the discourse and symbolic 
expression of populist actors is as crucial for studies of their government participation as 
in opposition (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Saward, 2006). Existing analyses have identified 
the different populist definitions of ‘the people’ according to ideology (right and left), 
geography (Europe and South America) and time (for example, the discursive shift of 
radical right parties towards ‘cultural differentialism’ in recent decades) without 
consideration of particularities that may be found at the sub-national level. 
Research Design 
To assess these hypotheses, I conduct a comparative analysis of three cases of PRR party 
executive participation. The parties are selected from within a party family that is 
relatively homogenous in terms of ideological priorities and policy profile (Ennser, 2012; 
Ivarsflaten, 2008). As a result, we can explore the influence of the institutional context on 
the implementation of their common ideals through comparison of their governing actions 
in different settings. The institutional contexts of the cases selected vary according to the 
degree to which they are a consensual form of democracy and the resulting constraint of 
compromise imposed upon governing parties (Fallend, 2011; Hendriks, 2010; Lijphart, 
2012). The adaptation of the consensual and opposed majoritarian models of democracy 
to the local level requires modification of the corresponding variables. The 
executiveparties dimension identifies the ease with which a single party can take control 
of the government, measured in this study across four variables.7 Firstly, the party system: 
whether two-or multi-party; secondly, the cabinet form: either a one-party concentration 
or a sharing of executive power with other parties; thirdly, the relations between the 
executive and legislative: whether the executive is dominant or power is balanced; and 
fourthly, the electoral system: whether majoritarian or proportional. The other federal-
unitary dimension is assessed through one relevant variable, to assess the extent to which 
a party in government can change policy. Through assessment of the degree of 
decentralisation, we can identify the corresponding level of functional competence and 
policy discretion allocated to the local level of government (Kersting & Vetter, 2003, pp. 
22–25; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002).8 As shown in Table 3, a range in consensual democracy 
in terms of these criteria is provided by the selection of, from low to high: Italy, Austria 
and the Swiss canton of Bern. 
The capacity of the local executive to initiate direct democracy also varies between 
these three contexts, as shown in Table 4. Citizens and opposition in all three settings can 
initiate referendums. In addition, the local executive in Austria can initiate referendums 
on issues within its competence, while in Italy and Switzerland the government may only 
introduce mandatory referendums on certain prescribed topics. 
The cities are selected based on the senior position of a PRR party in the local 
government executive and occupation of the mayoralty. Larger cities were favoured, as a 
greater population size of the municipality tends to offer greater resources for parties to 
perform ideologically distinctive action. The cities selected are the largest to have been 
 
governed by the PRR in their respective countries in the current decade: Padua in Italy, 
Wels in Austria, and Thun in the Swiss canton of Bern. In Padua, the election of a Lega 
Nord mayor was a break with centre-left and – right party rule throughout the post-war 
period, while the election victories of the FPÖ in Wels and the SVP in Thun in 2014 and 
2010 respectively led to the first PRR mayors following decades of social democratic rule. 
They therefore provide insight into the (mutual) impact of PRR parties in local 
government power for the first time. In a period when these parties seem increasingly 
likely to attain positions of power, these sub-national cases provide insights into their 
ideological priorities, made evident through the gap between rhetoric and government 
policy. 
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Source: Loughlin et al. (2011). 
 
Table 4. Local direct democracy in case environments. 
 
Local direct democracy instruments 
Direct democracy capacity 
of local executive 
Italy Laws 142/90 1990 and 265/99 1999 introduce for citizens popular 
initiatives, consultative and abrogative, and for the executive 
mandatory referendums regarding mergers of municipalities and 
changes of region; 50% turnout required. Rarely used. 
- 
Austria Right for executive to initiate binding and non-binding referendums; for 
council, a recall referendum; and for citizens, an agenda initiative 
quorum: 20% of electorate. Rarely used: less than once per year across 
Austria since 1945 (Kersting & Vetter, 2003, p. 128). 
+ 
Switzerland Three types: for governments, mandatory referendum, e.g., regarding 
budget, and for citizens, the optional referendum, with a quota 2.5–
20% can force the submission of a government decision to a popular 
vote, and the initiative, with a quota 2.5–20% can propose a new bill 
to be submitted to a popular vote. Frequently used: on average 30 
voting opportunities for a Swiss citizen each year (Kersting & Vetter, 
2003, p. 144). 
- 
Source: Kersting and Vetter (2003); Schiller (2017). 
 
To investigate the implementation of a ‘populist democratic agenda’, I explore the 
expression of the concepts of popular sovereignty and ‘the people’ by PRR parties in 
positions of local government leadership. I conduct a qualitative content analysis of three 
types of executive action: direct democratic instruments, their policies introduced more 
broadly, and their interactions with the council. Regarding the latter, the meetings of the 
council in Padua and Wels are analysed, with the executive chairing the meetings and able 
to propose resolutions; while in Thun, the government responses to council questions are 
analysed. The material used is outlined in Table 5. To compare between the cases, the 
institutional and political contexts are explored with the aid of expert interviews and 
secondary literature to determine the respective forms of local democracy. 
PRR Parties in Local Government: Consequences for Representative 
Democracy 
Before analysis of how these local government cases utilise the new opportunities to 
implement a populist democratic agenda, this section first outlines the systemic constraints 
each face. These are considered with reference to the electoral system, the form of the 
cabinet, and the resulting balance of power between the executive and the wider council 
(see Table 3). 
The 1993 reforms to the Italian local government generated a new model of mayoral 
dominance (Baldini & Legnante, 2000, p. 69; Magnier, 2004). Upon election in 2014, 
Table 5. Government actions analysed in study. 
 Direct and participatory democratic 
methods Local government policies 
Local government 
interactions with council 
Padua, Italy 
Lega Nord mayor; 
period analysed: 
2014–16 
Proposed referendum on 
intermunicipal 
amalgamation(referenced in this 
paper as PRef, May 2016). 
Emergency Ordinances 
issued by mayor (PP, 
2014–16). 








Survey of citizens (WRef, Oct. 2016). Proposals publicised in 
council newsletters 
(WP, 2015–2017). 
FPO resolutions from 
Wels council meetings 
(WR, 2015–2017). 
Thun, Switzerland 
SVP mayor; period 
analysed: 2010–17 
Multiple government-initiated 
referendums (TRef, 2011–2018). 
Executive strategy 
documents (TP, 2011, 
2015). 
Executive responses to 
Thun council questions 
(TR, 2011–2018). 
the Lega Nord mayor in Padua gained personal responsibility over the appointment of the 
executive and was guaranteed a majority in the council. The relatively weak council body 
can only remove the mayor by dissolving itself and calling new elections.9 In order to 
secure support from the council, the executive members chosen included the centreright 
Forza Italia and far-right Fratelli d’Italia from the cross-party electoral coalition. In both 
Wels and Thun, the executive is instead formed via a process of proportional allocation.10 
Following the 2015 Wels council election, the executive comprised four FPÖ members, 
three SPÖ (Social Democratic Party) and one ÖVP (People’s Party). A formal coalition 
between the FPÖ and the ÖVP was agreed to achieve a working majority. As in the Italian 
system, Austrian mayors are dominant over local politics (Fallend, 2011, p. 20). In the 
Swiss case of Thun, the SVP gained the mayoral position as the biggest party with 12 of 
 
40 seats in the parliament and two of five in the executive (Schiess, 2010). Power is shared 
with the SP (Social Democratic Party) and BDP (Conservative Democratic Party) in a 
multi-party executive, as is typical at all levels of Swiss politics (Lijphart, 2012, p. 33). 
The mayor in this context is weak, and presides over a collegiate city government in a 
highly consensual form. The three cases therefore differ in the degree to which the 
governing PRR parties attained dominance over coalition partners and local government 
functioning as a product of the electoral systems. 
The Promotion of Popular Sovereignty by PRR Parties in Local Government 
Do these parties promote popular sovereignty within the established form of representative 
democracy once in government? The capacity for party actors to involve citizens in 
governance more directly depends upon the varying institutional openness of the setting 
(see Table 4). Analysis of the usage of varied direct democratic instruments by PRR 
government actors and their surrounding discourse provides insight into their different 
conceptions of the linkage between citizens and local government within these confines. 
Italian local governments have been authorised to hold consultative referendums as a 
means of popular participation since a 1990 reform, along with other forms of public 
consultation (Council of Europe, 1993; Vesperini, 2009).11 In Padua, the PRR-led 
executive proposed just one referendum: to approve an administrate reform for the merger 
of nearby Ponte San Nicolò with its own municipality.12 The mayor justified his support 
for the measure in terms of the primacy of the will of the people: 
Mayor Bitonci has already declared in favour [of the referendum], underlining how important 
it is, on these issues, to listen above all to what citizens want and how important it is to then 
give them the right tools to evaluate the facts. (Padova Oggi, 2016) 
After two years of the full five-year term the mayor lost a vote of confidence, before this 
or any other referendums could be held. In a sense, this demonstrates how the horizontal 
autonomy of the ‘strong mayor’ within the reformed Italian system is not matched by 
sufficient resources to manage the complex relationships involved in urban governance 
(Magnier, 2003). More crucially, as expanded upon in the following section, this 
illustrates how the model of government in Padua was one of excessively personal control 
by a mayor in pursuit of nativist aims ideologically closer to his own PRR party than his 
centre-right coalition partners. Ultimately, this proved to be his downfall: a majority of 
the council including coalition partners Forza Italia accused the ‘solitary leader’ of 
betrayal of agreements in favour of governing alone (Custodero, 2016). Without recourse 
to participatory methods, the style of government was one that remained representative in 
character. Yet a shift towards plebiscitarianism is shown in the PRR mayor’s pursuit of a 
personal linkage with citizens without mediation from party intermediaries, particularly 
by coalition partners. 
Local governments in Upper Austria may initiate referendums, special assemblies and 
surveys (Bürgerbefragungen). However, these instruments of participatory and direct 
democracy are rarely used in a strongly representative environment (Eberhard, 2013). A 
year after the FPÖ gained power in Wels, they initiated their first experiment with popular 
participation via a survey of citizens on a package of proposed policies (WR Oct. 2016). 
 
The survey asked residents five questions: two regarding the expansion of public transport 
services, one on changes to road planning, one about a reduction in education costs and 
one about a reduction in spending on culture. Each of the questions was approved by a 
majority of voters, however at a very low level of turnout: just 6,000 voters, or 15% of the 
population. The extremely low turnout can be explained by the uncontentious topics, the 
structuration of the questions to ensure the preferred response, along with the lack of other 
higher-order elections held simultaneously to boost turnout. The FPÖ mayor nevertheless 
promised to execute the approved proposals and affirmed the survey was an expression of 
expanded popular sovereignty: 
"There is always talk of direct democracy and civic participation. Here we have done just that". 
(Nowak, 2016) 
Following accusations of improper use of citizen data by the government in the survey 
process, a local newspaper sympathetic to the PRR similarly defended the action as a 
challenge to the existing representative model: 
Aloofness and lack of closeness to citizens are often mentioned when it comes to the bad 
image of politics. Because the Mayor wanted to fight against precisely that and ask his 
citizens about the development of the city, he is now attacked by the Data Protection 
Authority of Vienna! (Wochenblick, 2017) 
The survey, along with other heavily circumscribed initiatives with minimal popular 
involvement, demonstrate a limited attempt by the FPÖ to expand popular participation 
in the decision-making process which does not increase responsiveness to citizen 
preferences nor impose control over the executive to a greater extent.13 In this exception 
to the continuing representative character of governance, we see elements of 
plebiscitarianism – that is, a more direct linkage being made between citizens and 
government, yet with the latter firmly in control of the process. 
Instruments of direct democracy are famously well developed in Switzerland, with 
diverse forms and a high frequency of usage also found at the municipal level (Council of 
Europe, 1993; Kriesi & Trechsel, 2008, p. 49; Trechsel & Kriesi, 1996). In the canton of 
Bern, in which Thun is situated, local governments can submit mandatory referendums to 
the electorate for adoption and consultation but only in certain prescribed situations. More 
commonly, referendums are used by opposition parties to challenge government actions 
(Bützer, 2007, p. 222; Council of Europe, 1993, p. 51), and citizens may request 
referendums for proposals, or for the modification or abrogation of government proposals 
(Council of Europe, 1993, p. 49). The expansion of popular participation was a prominent 
aim of the SVP-led executive in Thun, as one of five legislative aims for the 2015–18 
period (TP 2015). However, referendums have not been used to a greater extent than 
previously: seven were held during 2011–2017, the same as in the previous seven-year 
period prior to SVP leadership. The referendums of the local executive have been 
ideologically uncontentious in content: all have focused on matters of urban planning, with 
the exception of a partial revision to the city constitution in November 2013.14 
Furthermore, the non-executive SVP councillors have not initiated any referendumsin line 
with their frequent opposition to migration related events in the town. Therefore the 
outcome of SVP participation in local government is not more of a participatory form than 
that of their predecessors, nor one that aims to challenge the status quo in terms of PRR 
 
ideological priorities. In fact, each of the three cases analysed seem to demonstrate 
themselves to be, as noted by Kaltwasser (2014, p. 484) of populists more generally, ‘not 
against representation per se, but rather [wanting] to see their own representatives in 
power’. The cases vary in the degree to which a more direct link between their 
representatives and the people is promoted by the populist-led local governments: more 
so in the Italian and Austrian cases than the Swiss. 
The Definition of ‘The People’ by PRR Parties in Local Government 
How do these PRR parties define ‘the people’ whom they aim to represent in power? This 
section explores the ways in which their policies and surrounding discourse delimit the 
boundaries of local citizenship. Its demarcation along ethno-cultural lines is a fundamental 
ideological component of the PRR, yet one that is implemented and expressed to starkly 
varying degrees in these cases. 
The increased power held by the mayor in the reformed Italian local government system 
has grown especially in two, previously unimportant, policy areas: social assistance and 
security (Magnier, 2004, p. 180). Security is a policy area in which local authorities 
possess significant responsibility since the introduction of mayor-issued emergency 
ordinances in 2008, which enable policy responses to their own defined threats 
(Ambrosini, 2013; Castelli Gattinara, 2016, p. 35). Furthermore it is a ‘golden issue’ of 
the PRR, located at the nexus of their key ideological tenets of authoritarianism, populism 
and nativism (Mudde, 2007). Like security, migration is another issue around which PRR 
parties mobilise the electorate , and a policy area over which Italian local governments 
have significant responsibility (Penninx, Kraal, Martiniello, & Vertovec, 2004;Rogers & 
Tillie, 2001). Prior analyses have shown the compatibility of these policy areas in the 
proliferation of security-oriented migration policy andmigrationoriented security policy 
(Caponio & Graziano, 2011; Gilbert, 2009). Under the Lega Nord-led executive in Padua, 
a connection with migrants is explicitly stated in a number of security ordinances that aim 
to obstruct, displace, or even remove their claimed threatening presence from urban space 
entirely.15 In addition, a measure to obstruct public housing for non-Italians – the ‘Paduans 
First’ policy – resulted in 92% of public housing going to Italian citizens between March 
and September 2016, in comparison to 67% between 2010 and 2012 (PP, Sep. 2016). As 
noted of urban migrationsecurity policies elsewhere, these actions not only serve to remind 
‘native’ citizens of the threat faced from outsiders but also the primacy of their status in 
comparison (Ambrosini, 2013). 
The FPÖ have also pursued a newly ethnocentric direction of policy in the local 
government of Wels. As well as the role of mayor, the FPÖ negotiated responsibility over 
the areas of integration and security, described throughout the campaign as the city’s 
primary problems (Pachner, 2013). Plans were announced to restrict a number of welfare 
benefits to Austrian nationals (Rohrhofer, 2015) and ban the Islamic headscarf for public 
employees (Herzog, 2017). However, due to the Austrian local government lacking the 
necessary legal powers, neither measure was implemented.16 Nevertheless, the publicising 
of these intentions functions as a strategy of party positioning regarding the demarcation 
of local citizenship. Furthermore, the long campaign to resist the placement of refugee 
centres in Wels was defended in terms of the threat to the people posed by an already high 
 
foreign population in the city (WR Jan. 2016, Feb. 2016; WP Feb. 2016, May 2016). The 
mayor repeatedly publicised his opposition as follows: 
The goal must continue to be closed as a city and to be united against the federal and regional 
governments in order to achieve the best possible result for Wels (WP Feb. 2016, May 
2016).17 
The concept of people as ethnos is also supported by the traditional ethno-cultural ideal 
presented in the new emphasis placed upon the folk festival Volksfest and German 
language culture in schools (WP Feb. 2017). Through these actions and the surrounding 
discourse, the FPÖ in Wels promote an antagonism with two groups – the political elites 
and those deemed to be outsiders in an ethno-cultural sense – in opposition to whom, the 
represented local and ‘native’ group can be more clearly constructed. 
The governing actions of the SVP-led executive in Thun have not demonstrated the 
ethnocentric intentions of the other two cases. The government has used an inclusive 
discursive formulation of ‘the people’ distant from the characteristic ethnocentric 
approach of the SVP (Bernhard, Kriesi, & Weber, 2015; Skenderovic, 2009). In the 
definition of the legislative aim of increased citizen participation, the executive outlines 
the following: 
Thun is a diverse city. The executive wants to increase the use of the potential within the 
population. For this purpose, all generations and broad sections of the population should be 
involved. (TP 2015) 
Non-executive party actors in the council nevertheless appear ideologically similar to the 
other cases examined in its nativism. This is shown by repeated questions to the executive 
from the SVP council representatives regarding migration and security, often in relation 
to resistance towards local refugee centres (TR Jun. 2011, Jun. 2013, Jan. 2016, Jun. 
2016). The moderation of the responses from the SVP mayor reflects a distance between 
the party in the executive and the council. While the council representatives remain 
‘responsive’ to migration issues and follow the ethnocentric party line, the local executive 
performs a ‘responsible’ administrative role and employ more pluralist framing of 
citizenship. Such a defence of executive decisions and programmes in opposition to their 
own representatives has previously been observed from other Swiss local government 
actors (Mcdonnell & Mazzoleni, 2014). This hybrid ‘one foot in, one foot out of 
government’ strategy has also been observed with PRR parties in national government 
(Albertazzi & Mcdonnell, 2005; Bernhard et al., 2015; Zaslove, 2012). In contrast with 
Mair’s (2011, p. 14) influential idea of a contemporary division of labour between 
‘responsive’ populist parties in opposition and ‘responsible’ mainstream parties in 
government, PRR parties are able to enact this division in office themselves with their 
own executive and parliamentary actors. 
Cross-National Variations in the Consequences of PRR Parties in Local Government for 
Local Representative Democracy 
Systems that allocate more personal control of local government to mayors have been 
theorised to lead to a mayoral preference for a more direct linkage between themselves 
and citizens, including through measures that weaken the role of the council (Haus & 
 
Sweeting, 2006; Heinelt & Hlepas, 2006). Furthermore, a recent cross-European survey 
of mayors found greater support for participatory as opposed to representative forms of 
government among figures in a ‘strong-mayor’ role compared to the weaker ‘committee-
leader’ role (Vetter, Heinelt, & Rose, 2018, p. 195). These cases demonstrate little 
evidence of an intensification of participatory methods of governance, regardless of the 
institutional setting. However, change to the existing representative principle is witnessed 
in the more direct linkage envisaged between the executive and the citizens in the cases 
of Padua and Wels. In the bypassing of intermediary institutions, while maintaining 
executive control over the procedure, these local governments have shown elements of 
plebiscitarianism. 
 
Table 6. Relation between form of local democracy and democratic agenda of PRR-led local 
government. 
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The most conspicuous change resulting from PRR control of local government – 
dependent upon the institutional setting – is in nativist policy output. Specifically, higher 
executive autonomy is associated with a stronger emphasis upon exclusionary nativism in 
PRR party-led local government output. With greater personal control and resulting 
capacity for ideological direction, the mayors in Wels and in particular Padua have focused 
upon a ‘performance of crisis’ , precipitated by migration and manifested in localised 
security risk (Moffitt, 2015; Paxton, 2019). In contrast, the distinctively moderate 
governing style of the PRR in Thun, despite the radical discourse of their non-executive 
council members, is related to the constraints faced by parties within the Swiss system of 
power-sharing. As defined by Lijphart (2012), consensus democracies have a less abrasive 
political culture, and more functional business-like proceedings due to the multiparty, 
proportional system. Prior studies of the SVP have shown their high level of populism 
during periods of opposition and (election and direct-democratic) campaigns decreases 
when in government (Bernhard, 2017; Bernhard et al., 2015). The findings from Thun 
suggest the SVP tends to display a decidedly non-populist, rather managerial approach, in 
the municipal, as well as cantonal and federal, levels of government. This study expands 
on past research to show that while nativism may be subdued among executive members, 
it is retained among the council representatives. An outline of the proposed relation 
 
between the local democratic form and the extent of the populist democratic agenda 
promoted by the PRR-led local governments is displayed in Table 6. 
 
Conclusion 
PRR parties have challenged representative democracy with persistent calls for the 
introduction and increased use of direct democracy (Mudde, 2007, p. 152; ; Taggart, 
2004). This article is the first to explore the extent to which such claims are implemented 
from positions of power in local government. Scarce evidence of a ‘participatory turn’ is 
found, regardless of the extent of opportunities offered in this arena. However, two sets of 
changes are evident in their actions that demonstrate a distinctive conception of 
representative democracy, more so when less constrained by the necessary of compromise 
with other parties. Firstly, in a more direct linkage envisaged between the executive and 
the citizens, characterised here as elements of plebiscitarianism. And secondly, in efforts 
to redefine ‘the people’ in nativist terms. This exploratory study suggests the democratic 
consequences of PRR party participation in local government are shaped by the relative 
strength of the executive within the political system: specifically, whether party actors are 
constrained within a consensual political system or freer to implement policy 
independently in more majoritarian systems. 
Studies of the consequences of populist parties for representative democracy must be 
careful to identify the contribution made by populism in isolation from their other 
ideological traits (Pappas, 2016, 2018; Rydgren, 2017; Stavrakakis, Katsambekis, 
Nikisianis, Kioupkiolis, & Siomos, 2017). The principal consequences posed by these 
PRR-led government actions for local representative democracy derive from their 
attempted resolution of the democratic boundary problem through an ethnically 
exclusionary formulation of the citizen; in other words, their higher degree of nativism. 
What is the contribution of populism to the democratic agenda in these cases? There are 
elements of a strengthening of the plebiscitarian idea of a more direct linkage between 
executive and citizen, but very little evidence of attempts to expand popular sovereignty 
through participatory interventions to rebalance the representative-direct democratic form. 
The remaining key ideological tenets of populism – people-centrism and anti-elitism – 
might be better conceptualised in these cases as discursive strategies through which the 
radical right ideology is advanced, rather than the most pertinent features to define these 
– fundamentally ‘radical right’, rather than populist-parties (Aslanidis, 2015; Rydgren, 
2017). 
Recent research on the policy influence and stability of populist parties in national 
government has refuted earlier accounts of these parties being ‘doomed to fail’ in power 
(Albertazzi & Mcdonnell, 2015; Zaslove, 2012). The local level of government offers 
expanded opportunities for investigation of the conditions for their degree of impact when 
in office. Future research should systematically test the hypotheses generated by these 
findings through expanded cross-country analyses, while following the strategy of varying 
cases according to the institutional form of local democracy and resulting executive 
autonomy. To isolate the contribution made by populism aside from the host party 
ideologies, cases of the populist left and centre in the leadership of local government 
should also be included. In so doing, future studies can evaluate and build upon this 
 
exploratory analysis of PRR governing practice to investigate whether and how local 
government functions as a laboratory for populist experimentation in democracy. 
Notes 
1. The idea of PRR parties using local government as a laboratory for policy experimentation 
is a common trope in press coverage (examples include: Kapeller, 2016; Chrisafis, 2015; 
Chassany, 2017). 
2. The strongest advocacy for participatory politics originated from New Left and green 
partysupporters with a grounding in post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1977, 1990); right-
wing populists of the ‘silent counter-revolution’ rather desire more effective and responsive 
leadership, at least in part due to a more authoritarian set of values (Ignazi, 1992; Mudde, 
2004, p. 558; Taggart, 2004). 
3. In contrast, populist left parties are more likely to distinguish ‘the people’ based on class 
(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013), while a ‘purely populist’ party like the Five Star Movement 
has attempted to create a homogenous entity without any qualifications (Manucci & Amsler, 
2018). 
4. For a rare example of a study that focuses on the influence of structural factors on populist 
parties in government, see: Zaslove (2012). 
5. It should be noted that the level of dissatisfaction with local representative democracy, as 
measured through for instance local electoral turnout and trust in local government (John, 
2001; Le Galès, 2002), in fact varies greatly across Europe. 
6. Local government output-legitimacy, on the other hand, has been addressed through 
administrative reforms to improve the efficacy of policy-outcomes via municipal 
amalgamations, decentralisation of power and other reforms labelled as ‘New Public 
Management’ (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). 
7. The interest groups variable used by Lijphart (2012) is excluded from this study due to the 
minimal amount of evidence available for this activity in governance of small and 
mediumsized cities. 
8. The other variables used by Lijphart (2012) but excluded from this study as unhelpful are: 
unicameral vs. bicameral legislature, the flexibility of the constitution, the presence of 
judicial review, and the independence of the central bank. 
9. Such a dissolution actually occurred in Padua in October 2016: a rare event in local 
Italianpolitics. 
10. In Wels, there are separate mayoral and council elections, the latter from which members 
ofthe executive are then proportionately drawn. In Thun, the executive and council are 
proportionately allocated through separate elections. 
11. Such referendums have famously led to the banning of cars from the city centre in 
severalmajor Italian cities (Bobbio, 2005, p. 44). 
12. The merger of small municipalities has been an important subject in plans to improve 
localgovernment service delivery and output-legitimacy, and requires a referendum in Italy 
(Hulst & Montfort, 2007; Swianiewicz, 2010). 
13. Other smaller scale examples of participatory governance initiatives in Wels include a 
(currently inactive) internet application ‘Mach Mit’ and a security consultation held in a 
local sauna (Nowak, 2017). 
14. According to the amendment, the objectives set by the executive in Thun would no 
longerrequire approval by the Legislative Body but just submission for information. Similar 
constitutional reforms were proposed, and passed, in 2005 and 2001. 
15. The ordinances that specify the security threat posed by migrants are prohibitions on 
prostitution (PP Apr. 2014; Feb. 2015) and vehicles for sleeping (PP Jul. 2015), and ones 
that legislate for health checks on arrivals from Africa (PP Nov. 2014) and hygiene checks 
on municipal housing (PP 2015). 
 
16. An ‘anti-face-veiling act’ was later passed by the national government in October 2017. 
17. Changes in the relations between the Wels local government and the Austrian federal 
government following the ascension to national power of the FPÖ after the 2018 Federal 
Election lie beyond the timescale of this study. 
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